In this paper we investigate the main features of the Italian financial cycle, extracted by means of a structural trend-cycle decomposition of the credit-to-GDP ratio, using annual observations from 1861 to 2011. In order to draw conclusions based on solid historical data, we provide a thorough reconstruction of the key balance-sheet time series of Italian banks, considering all the main assets and liabilities over the last 150 years. We come to three main conclusions. First, while there was a close correlation between loans and deposits (relative to GDP) until the mid-1970s, over the last 30 years this link has become more tenuous, and the volume of loans has increased in relation to deposits. The banks have covered this "funding gap" mainly by issuing new debt securities. Second, the Italian financial cycle has a much longer duration than traditional business cycles. Third, taking into account the deviation of the credit-to-GDP ratio from its trend, an acceleration of credit preceded a banking crisis in 8 out of the 12 episodes listed by Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) . A Logit regression confirms a positive association between the probability of a banking crisis and a previous acceleration of the credit-to-GDP gap. However, there were also periods -such as the early 1970s -in which the growth of the credit-to-GDP ratio was not followed by a banking crisis.
Introduction
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The latest crisis has highlighted that financial factors are important drivers of the economy and that financial and business fluctuations are tightly intertwined (see, for instance, Jordà, Schularick and Taylor, 2011b) . Banks' extension of credit to the economy plays a key role in the monetary transmission mechanism, through which monetary policy decisions affect economic activity and the price level. In a seminal paper, Bernanke (1983) stressed that monetary forces alone are quantitatively insufficient to explain the Great Depression's depth and persistence, creating the basis for a large literature on the credit channel in the transmission of monetary policy.
Monitoring credit developments is also relevant for the purposes of maintaining financial stability: in the Basel III global regulatory framework, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS, 2010) proposed implementing a countercyclical capital buffer in order to protect the banking system and the economy from periods of excess credit growth or deceleration. It was also suggested that the credit-to-GDP ratio gap constitute an indicator of excessive credit growth. 2 The credit-to-GDP ratio gap is defined as the deviation of bank loans -expressed as a ratio to GDP -from its long-term trend and thus is itself a measure of the financial cycle, and an indicator of financial leverage (Borio, 2012) . Given the relevance of credit fluctuations to policy analysis, several efforts have been made recently to provide an estimate of the financial cycle. Drehmann, Borio and Tsatsaronis (2012) attempt to identify the financial cycle for the US and other selected countries. They suggest measuring the financial cycle by combining credit and property prices. Borio (2012) studies the stylised features of the financial cycle and argues that it has a longer duration and wider amplitude than the traditional business cycle. Furthermore, he believes that the credit gap is highly informative with regard to detecting financial distresses and evaluating the risks of future systemic banking crises: hence, it is important for policy-makers to ensure that the credit gap is properly monitored. A similar view is shared by Schularick and Taylor (2012) , who conclude that credit aggregates provide information about the likelihood of future financial crises and that the latter should be viewed as "credit booms gone wrong" (p. 1042). Also Borio (2012) 1 We wish to acknowledge the contribution of Fabio Farabullini, Miria Rocchelli and Alessandra Salvio to a previous version of this manuscript. While assuming the scientific responsibility for any errors in the paper, the authors are grateful to Fabio Busetti, Alfredo Gigliobianco, Claire Giordano, Giuseppe Grande, Giuseppe Marinelli, Giacomo Sbrana, Moritz Schularick, Massimiliano Stacchini, Marie Vander Donckt and participants in seminars held at the Bank of Italy and at the Italian Ministry of Economy and Finance for helpful comments and discussion. Final version forthcoming in: Cliometrica. The final publication is available at http://rd.springer.com/journal/11698 2 For opposite views on the effectiveness of early warning indicators of financial crises see Borio and Drehmann (2009) and Rose and Spiegel (2009). argues that most banking crises tend to be preceded by rapid credit expansion, occurring close to the peak of the financial cycle. 3 Yet, to our knowledge, a comprehensive analysis of the empirical features of the financial cycle has not yet been undertaken for Italy. Thus, in this paper, we complement the works by Drehmann, Borio and Tsatsaronis (2012) and investigate the main characteristics and regularities of the Italian financial cycle. Furthermore, we examine whether there is any link between systemic banking crises and long-term credit developments in Italy.
In order to draw conclusions based on consistent historical data, we provide a thorough reconstruction of the key balance sheet time series of Italian banks, on an annual basis, considering all the main assets and liabilities. As a result, our investigation relies on a historical dataset which extends from the unification of Italy in 1861 until the present day. This is crucial since financial cycles are often thought of as being more protracted than business cycles; hence, samples covering long periods of time are needed for accurate econometric estimation.
In the past, several scholars have been involved in collecting data with the aim of reconstructing long-term time series on banking and financial sectors. These efforts started with the 1967 two-volume book by De Mattia, continued with the works by Biscaini and Ciocca (1979) , and the 1996 book by Cotula et al. Despite this, the existing historical time series cover limited periods; this is due to changes in the structure of the financial sector, to breaks in the methodology used over time in response to financial innovation, to changes in the definition of monetary and credit aggregates, and to discontinuities in the statistics. This is clearly a limitation of the extant literature. For instance, De Mattia's data focus on the post-unification period up to 1936. The data reported by Cotula et al. (1996) cover a narrower time span, from 1890 to 1936. More recently, Della Torre et al. (2008) have provided estimates only for the period 1861-1914. According to Della Torre, De Mattia's has underestimated the data for the years around unification, especially because they do not cover the entire population of savings banks. Yet, the new data estimated by Della Torre et al. (2008) refer only to the funding of intermediaries.
Against this background, we combine data from various sources, join often discontinued data series and contribute additional information at the disaggregated level. In doing so, we seek to maintain a constant coverage with regard to instruments, institutional categories, counterpart sectors and compiling methods along all the time span 1861-2011. In our view, this represents an improvement on the existing literature, as we are building and documenting a historical dataset which is methodologically consistent over the last 150 years.
The rest of this paper is organised as follows: Section 2 describes the content of the database, the compiling methodology used and the improvements on the previous literature; Section 3 illustrates the evolution of the data over the last 150 years and presents a discussion of the main features emerging from our new statistics; Section 4 presents the estimation results for a trend-cycle decomposition of the Italian credit-to-GDP ratio; Section 5 examines the relationship between the phases of the financial cycle and the occurrence of banking crises; Section 6 contains the main conclusions and hints at possible paths for further study.
A description of the new historical dataset
In this section we provide a description of the new dataset, which is available on the Bank of Italy's website. 4 For additional details, the interested reader may refer to De Bonis et al. (2012) . Table 1 presents our reconstruction of the main items on the assets and liabilities side of the banking sector, from 1861 to 2011: short-term loans (i.e., with a duration of less than 18 months) and long-term loans (i.e., with a duration of more than 18 months), securities other than shares (or debt securities held), shares and other equity, fixed assets, deposits, debt securities issued, and capital and reserves. 5 As is customary for banking statistics, aggregates are calculated at current prices. The reconstruction of the main aggregates allows for a "balancing" of balance sheets, providing an indicator of the reliability of our estimates. The imbalance between total assets -the sum of loans, debt securities held, shares and other equity, and fixed assets -and liabilities -the sum of deposits, debt securities issued, and capital and reserves -is not too large. It amounts, on average, to about 4 per cent of total assets. The major discrepancies, with values of around 15 per cent, are found during the period spanning World War II, when the quality of the available statistics and details fell dramatically.
In constructing the database, we make use of multiple sources: from 1864 to 1889 , De Mattia (1967 is used, with our estimates for the first years after unification. From 1890 to 1936, Cotula et al. (1996) is used, with the exception of some institutional categories of banks, including special credit institutions and monti di pietà, taken from De Mattia (1967) .
6 Some 4 At the address: http://www.bancaditalia.it/pubblicazioni/pubsto/quastoeco/quadsto 26 (in Italian). 5 For the purposes of compiling the series, the following definitions of loans and deposits have been adopted: loans mainly comprise credit granted to households and non-financial corporations; interbank loans are excluded. Loans are estimated net of bad debts because of the difficulties in finding data in the past. As for liabilities, deposits consist mostly of funds collected from households and non-financial corporations, while interbank deposits are excluded. 6 The expression "special credit institutions" was introduced after the approval of the Banking Law in 1936;
before 1936 this category included intermediaries granting credit to the agricultural sector, to the real estate sector, to the industrial sector. They mainly provided long-term credit, issuing bonds and deposits with agreed maturity, without collecting current accounts. Concerning the reporting sector, the banking system covers all the institutional categories of banks resident in Italy and the branches of foreign banks. The time series include both commercial banks that could raise short-term funds (aziende di credito) and special credit institutions (istituti di credito speciale), the two institutional categories existing until the 1990s. It also includes the mutual banks -formerly the rural and artisans' banks -often excluded from earlier estimations.
It should be noted that in the first years after unification, given the backwardness of the banking system, a significant proportion of total lending to the economy was granted by the banks of issue, whose loans and deposits are reported as a memorandum item in Table 1.   7 Between 1861 and 1936, banks of issue in Italy operated with private entities as well as with other banks. The banks of issue were among the largest Italian intermediaries and, until the 1870s, their loans exceeded those of commercial banks. Subsequently, they ran out of steam, except during World War I, with the public financing of the conflict.
Regarding the counterpart sector, the information relates to residents in Italy, following the methodology normally used for building monetary and credit aggregates. We focus on residents' loans and deposits because those of non-residents remain negligible today. For most of its history, the Italian banking system has had limited links with foreign countries. Only since the 1980s have European directives and the liberalisation of capital movements led to stronger relations with non-residents.
In the next Section, we will comment on the evolution of the main balance sheet items, focusing on loans and deposits.
The evolution of loans and deposits over the last 150 years
Italy, a country that arrived later than others at political unification, had a fragmented and underdeveloped banking system in 1861. Barter was common and citizens mainly used coins 7 In 1861, there were four banks of issue in Italy: Banca Nazionale nel Regno d'Italia, Banca Nazionale Toscana, Banco di Napoli and Banco di Sicilia. In 1864, Banca Toscana di Credito per le Industrie e il Commercio d'Italia was added to the list. Following the annexation of Rome, in 1870, the banks of issue were joined by Banca Romana. During the crisis of 1893, they were reduced to three: Banco di Napoli, Banco di Sicilia and the newly created Bank of Italy. In 1926, the Bank of Italy became the only bank of issue, assuming the characteristics of a modern central bank.
8
to settle business transactions. The evolution of banks over the subsequent 150 years can be summed up in the "long run-up" (or "catching-up") metaphor (Onado, 2003) . As in the case of per capita income, the size and characteristics of the Italian financial system have gradually come closer to those prevailing in major industrial countries.
The new time series reconstructed allow us to discuss the long-run evolution of the Italian banking system since political unification in order to interpret this "run-up". Figure 1 displays bank loans (or credit), bank deposits, and currency in circulation, as a percentage of gross domestic product (GDP) at current prices -based on the new estimate of the Italian GDP series presented by Baffigi (2011) .
In 1861, both loans and deposits accounted for negligible percentages of GDP (about 1 per cent). In Italy, the low diffusion of bank deposits led to coins and notes being used to settle exchanges. In addition, as can be seen in the same figure, until 1867 the metallic circulation was larger than that of paper notes. Until the late nineteenth century, their sum -the total currency in circulation -was greater than the stock of bank deposits. The low diffusion of bank deposits and the widespread use of metal currency in Italy until the late nineteenth century, a peculiarity in the international panorama, has been commented on and explained by coeval economists: the size of the agricultural sector in the Italian economy and the subsequent slow industrialization process are the main factors highlighted by Supino (1895) and Fanno (1912) (see Giordano, 2010, 2012 , for more details).
After 1861, loans and deposits grew at a rapid pace until the late 1880s. The growth of credit was interrupted by the banking crisis in the early 1890s which was resolved with the creation of the Bank of Italy in 1893. Credit growth was revived in the second half of the 1890s and over the subsequent years of economic development, when Giolitti was head of the Italian Government. This acceleration of credit growth is compatible with the ideas of Gerschenkron (1962) on the replacement of the failed French-style banks with German-style universal banks in the 1890s. 8 The latter exported their business model to Italy, mobilised savings and promoted industrial investment, as they did in Germany (De Cecco, 2011) ; for a sceptical view, see Fohlin (1999) . 9 8 Also according to Luigi Einaudi and his colleagues at the Turin school of economics, the Italian economy experienced an upward phase in the 1898-1908 "Giolittian growth period", characterised by technological innovations, improvements in productivity, and the formation of German-style "universal banks" (Sella and Marchionatti, 2012) . 9 While universal banking has been often associated by economic historians with sharper growth and higher economic development, other studies has called into question Gerschenkron's hypothesis: recently, Piluso (2010) argues that universal banking is not necessarily related to sustained growth (for instance, the 1950s-1960s "Italian economic miracle" was not dependent on the prevailing banking system at that time). Thus, according to Piluso, banking patterns and credit regulation do not always contribute to the country's macro performance (see also Conti, 2010) .
After decreasing during the World War I, the volume of both loans and deposits grew strongly in the 1920s, exceeding 50 per cent of GDP at the outbreak of the Great Depression. The performance of loans and deposits in the 1930s fits in well with the literature on bank failures in Italy during the Great Depression -see for instance Ferri and Garofalo (1994) -who provided evidence of a credit crunch. 10 With World War II and the associated inflation, loans and deposits decreased gradually to 15 per cent of GDP in the second half of the 1940s, returning to the levels they were at in 1885. On the contrary, from the 1950s to the mid-1970s -the period of the greatest developments in the Italian economy -loans and deposits increased considerably, reaching 75 per cent of GDP.
As of 1974, a decline in the credit-to-GDP ratio can be observed, followed by a slight rise in the second half of the 1980s, which continued until the beginning of the 1990s. The depositsto-GDP ratio shows a similar, but less marked decrease, always being above the credit-to-GDP level. The gap was closed in 1989. This behaviour can be explained by the introduction of credit ceilings for loans to the private sector: they started in 1973 and were subsequently extended until the second half of the 1980s, after a short interruption between March 1975 and October 1976. Afterwards, with the exception of the recession in 1992-1993, loans increased more than deposits, reaching levels never seen before, as a result of the removal of credit ceilings, increased bank competition, and lower interest rates. Figure 1 allows us to examine the co-movements of credit-to-GDP and deposits-to-GDP. In fact, visual inspection reveals two distinct phases of the two series: although, in the postunification period, and for most of the twentieth century, credit-to-GDP and deposits-to-GDP exhibit a close co-movement, this link seems to have been more tenuous since the 1970s. More specifically, using simple correlations we can see that the two series co-move tightly together up until 1973 -end of the Bretton Woods system, characterised by capital controls and tight financial regulation -with a correlation coefficient of 0.98; afterwards, in the 1974-2010 sample period, they follow rather different paths and, as a result, the correlation is almost null. Nowadays, bank loans are more than 100 per cent of GDP, while deposits are around 70 per cent; the latter having almost returned to the levels reached in the 1970s. The Italian banking system funded the gap between loans and deposits mainly by issuing new bonds.
As shown in Figure 2 , the ratio of loans to deposits oscillates around 1 up until the mid1990s, and suddenly increases to 1.4 in 2000. Conversely, the ratio of loans to the sum of deposits and debt securities issued by banks is somewhat stable from 1861 to 2011.
Focusing on the loans-to-deposits ratio, Figure 2 shows that this indicator increased notably during the real estate boom of the 1880s, rising to 1.2 in 1890, the highest value in the nineteenth century. After declining up until the outbreak of World War I, the ratio rose again in the 1920s and 1930s, before the explosion of the banking crises and the start of World War II. Growth in the loans-to-deposits ratio occurred during the economic boom of 1958-1963, when it rose above 1 (in 1944, it was equal to 0.6). In the 1980s and the 1990s, it was then affected by the slowdown in deposits, owing to households switching to other uses of savings, such as government bonds and mutual funds. The ratio reached its historical peak of 1.65 in 2007, and then fell as a result of the 2008-2009 recession. The increasing gap between loans and deposits -the "funding gap" -is in fact a trend common to other banking systems and is considered one of the causes of the financial crisis in some countries (see Barwell and Burrows, 2011 , on the UK case). Over the last 150 years, the loans-to-deposits ratio has been influenced by the degree of international openness of the banking system and the consequent reliance on foreign capital markets. In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the internationalisation of Italian banks was limited. After World War II, internationalisation increased, and accelerated with the entry into force of the European exchange rate arrangements, especially with the liberalisation of capital movements in 1990 and the creation of the euro area in 1999. The use of interbank foreign funding -in recent years banks have been net foreign debtors -together with the increased availability of equity and bond funding, explains why the loans-to-deposits ratio after the EMU onset has reached levels far above one. Our conclusion is consistent with the results presented by Schularick and Taylor (2012) : looking at industrial countries, they claim that, while in the past credit was closely tied to money, financial innovation and regulation have, later on, broken this link.
Trend-cycle extraction from the credit-to-GDP ratio
In this section, we focus on the credit-to-GDP ratio in order to examine the main stylised features of the Italian financial cycle. This variable, which has often been proposed in the empirical macro literature (Borio, 2012) , has a number of interesting properties: being expressed as a ratio to GDP, it is normalised by the size of the economy and facilitates international comparison. Being a ratio of levels, it is generally smoother than a variable calculated as differences in log-levels, such as credit growth (BCBS, 2010) .
A structural decomposition of this indicator is performed in order to obtain an estimate of the credit-to-GDP ratio gap, which is defined as the deviation of credit-to-GDP from its longrun trend. In general, a number of econometric approaches are available to identify cyclical fluctuations and to obtain a dating for the cycle. To this end, non-parametric and parametric methods can be employed (see Mills, 2009 , for a retrospective on the modelling of trends and cycles in economic time series).
For instance, in classical business cycle analysis, a fully non-parametric procedure was proposed in the 1970s by Bry and Boschan (1971) in order to identify turning points. This method essentially allows the expansions and recessions in economic activity identified by peaks and troughs in the cycle to be dated. Another non-parametric method is provided by the Baxter and King (1999) filter, which is a band-pass filter, meaning a filter built to eliminate fluctuations outside a predetermined frequency band.
Regarding parametric procedures, several approaches allow trend-cycle decompositionsdesigned to separate the trend from its cyclical deviations -to be performed. The most popular trend-cycle decomposition is probably that suggested by Beveridge and Nelson (1981) , which defines the trend as the limiting forecast of the time series -adjusted for its mean rate of change -and the cycle in a residual manner. Other model-based decompositions can be performed using unobserved components models. Representations of unobserved components allow the observed time series to be decomposed into frequency components, i.e., a permanent trend, and into other residual stationary components such as cycles and seasonals. Each of these components characterises a different fluctuation pattern in the data: for instance, the trend component represents the evolution of the series in the long-run. The cyclical component is instead linked to the recurrence and alternation of phases, such as business activity, while the seasonal component captures systematic and repetitive fluctuations.
In order to extract a measure of the Italian financial cycle over the past 150 years, we apply a fully parametric procedure. In particular, we fit the stochastic trend plus cycle structural time series model proposed by Harvey (1989) to the Italian credit-to-GDP ratio series:
in which the time series y t (t = 1, . . . , T ) is thought of as being composed by a stochastic trend component τ t , a cyclical component ψ t and a transitory disturbance term ǫ t which captures the more erratic fluctuations of the data. Intervention variables such as outliers and structural breaks may be added to (1) . In the context of unobserved components models, trends and cycles are latent variables that have to be represented parametrically. The stochastic trend τ t is assumed to follow a local linear trend model, such as:
where β t is a stochastic slope which moves up or down because of the disturbance term ξ t . The trend, the slope and the irregular disturbances are mutually independent. In particular, they are normal and independently distributed (NID) with mean zero and variances σ
The local linear trend is a very flexible parameterisation since it encompasses several alternative specifications widely employed in empirical applications. For instance, when σ 2 ξ = 0 and σ 2 η > 0, the slope is fixed and the trend is a random walk with constant drift. In contrast, when σ 2 η = 0 and σ 2 ξ > 0, the trend is an integrated random walk and the resulting specification is often referred to as "smooth trend". Interestingly, the popular Hodrick and Prescott (1997) filter (HP filter) proves to be a smooth trend model (σ 2 η = 0) in which the smoothness parameter is chosen according to the observation frequency (Harvey and Jaeger, 1993) ; for instance, it is restricted to be equal to 1600 when working with quarterly data. It can be shown (Harvey, 1989 ) that the reduced form of a local linear trend model is an ARIMA(0,2,2), i.e.
2 )ζ t , whose parameters are functions of the original structural
In implementing the HP filter, when the restriction
= 1600 is imposed, the two implied ARIMA(0,2,2) moving average parameters can be promptly calculated: θ 1 = −1.777; θ 2 = 0.799. 12 The calibration of the smoothness parameter in the HP filter for different time frequencies is extensively discussed by Ravn and Uhlig (2002) and Maravall and del Rio (2007) . In equation (1), the stochastic cycle ψ t is stationary and evolves according to the following bivariate AR(1)
where κ 1t and κ 2t are mutually independent white noise disturbances with the same variance σ 2 , while 0 < ρ < 1 is the damping factor and 0 < λ c < π is the frequency of the cycle, measured in radians. The cycle periodicity is 2π λc . The variable ψ * t only appears by construction. The cycle in (3) can be further expressed as:
The right-hand side of (4) is equivalent to a moving average of order one. 13 As a consequence, the cycle can be reparameterised in the ARMA(2,1) form with complex roots Sbrana (2011) derives the analytical relationships between structural and reduced form parameters of the local linear trend model with correlated shocks. 12 Sbrana (2013) provides the implied values of θ 1 and θ 2 when λ = 100 (annual data: θ 1 = −1.558; θ 2 = 0.638) and λ = 14400 (monthly data θ 1 = −1.871; θ 2 = 0.879). 13 See, among others, Sbrana and Silvestrini (2012) , who study the consequences of temporal aggregation on the cyclical component model as in (3).
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where κ t is a white noise disturbance with variance σ 2 κ . When θ = 0, the ARMA(2,1) representation reduces to an AR(2) cycle, as in Clark (1987) .
Estimation of the trend plus cycle model in (1), (2) and (3) is conducted using STAMP 8.2 (Koopman, Harvey, Doornik and Shephard, 2007) . Several different specifications for the cyclical component are evaluated with STAMP: "LLT" is the local linear trend model as in Harvey (1989) ; "LLT(S)" is the "smooth trend" model in which σ 2 η = 0 and σ 2 ξ > 0. "LLT+Stoch. Cycle" is the local linear trend model with stochastic cycle as in (3) and (4); "LLT+AR (2)" is the local linear trend model with a stationary AR(2) component. Similarly for the "smooth trend" specifications (i.e., "LLT(S)+Stoch. Cycle" and "LLT(S)+AR(2)").
We refer to Table 2 for a diagnostic check of the residuals of the fitted models. Table 2 presents standard descriptive statistics such as the serial correlation test, the normality test and the log-likelihood. The normality test statistic is the Bowman-Shenton statistic with Doornik and Hansen's (1994) correction, distributed under the null hypothesis as χ 2 (2) . The Q test statistic of residual autocorrelation is the Box-Ljung statistic for residual serial correlation, based on the first 12 residual autocorrelations.
Overall, all the diagnostics appear satisfactory. Based on the goodness-of-fit statistics reported in Table 2 , the "LLT+AR(2)" seems to provide the most appropriate description of the long-run and cyclical properties of the credit-to-GDP ratio series, and is preferred to its "smooth trend" version ("LLT+AR(2)"). "LLT(S)+Stoch. Cycle" is also an appropriate model, but it presents a slightly worse fitting. The "LLT+Stoch. Cycle" model features a very similar fit with respect to the "LLT(S)+Stoch. Cycle", and hence its diagnostics are not shown in Table 2 . "LLT" and "LLT(S)" are more restrictive models which seem to fit the data less adequately.
Maximum likelihood estimation results for the "LLT+AR(2)" are presented in Table 3 , while for model "LLT(S)+Stoch. Cycle" estimates are provided in Table 4 .
For "LLT+AR(2)", σ For "LLT(S)+Stoch. Cycle", the irregular variance has been estimated to be zero. The damping factor is 0.94296 and therefore the cyclical component is stationary. The period of the stochastic cycle is roughly 23 years: thus, in Italy, the credit-to-GDP gap has a much longer duration than traditional business cycles. In fact, based on the sample 1861-2010, Baffigi et al. (2013) Our evidence for Italy corresponds to the average duration of the financial and business cycles in the United States and in other advanced countries. Indeed, according to the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER), business cycles have an average periodicity between two and eight years. In contrast, Drehmann, Borio and Tsatsaronis (2012) find that for the US and other selected countries 16 the financial cycle lasts between 10 and 20 years, depending on whether the economy was liberalised or not.
A tentative interpretation of our findings is that changes in the banking regulatory framework are a major factor that affect the financial cycle. As regulatory measures may last for decades -one may refer to the Italian Banking Act that was in effect from 1936 to 1993 -the financial cycle has a greater duration than the business cycle. This claim implicitly suggests that those factors driving the business cycle -labour, capital and technological progress -are subject to faster changes than regulatory measures. This is in our view a reasonable hypothesis.
A similar message appears when fitting a "LLT" in order to extract the trend component from credit-to-GDP and considering the resulting (standardised) residuals, which somehow constitute an estimate of the cyclical component. The top panel of Figure 3 displays a graph of these residuals. The bottom panel of Figure 3 shows a plot of their estimated power spectrum. The power spectrum -or spectral density -is an alternative representation of the sample autocovariance function, in terms of frequencies rather than time. The area under the spectrum for a given frequency band can be interpreted as the contribution to the variance of the time series that should be assigned to the frequencies covered in the considered range. In Figure 3 , the spectrum has its global maximum at 0.27, corresponding to a cycle of around 23 years, which explains the largest part of the variance of the series. A second cycle of around 9 years seems also be present (corresponding to a local maximum at 0.68 on the horizontal axis).
Some outliers and level breaks are automatically estimated by STAMP, allowing to take account of data irregularities (for example, World War I, World War II, the oil shock in [1973] [1974] . Estimates of the intervention variables are presented in Table 5 for "LLT+AR(2)" and in Table 6 for "LLT(S)+Stoch. Cycle". 17 Three outliers (1924, 1942, 1974) and four level breaks (1919, 1935, 1937, 1944) are detected. They are all statistically significant at the 1% level. Figure 4 shows the original credit-to-GDP series, the estimated smoothed level (with in- 15 Working with industrial production data over the 1866-1913 period, these authors identify for 13 advanced North Atlantic economies (Australia, Austria, Canada, France, Germany, Hungary, the Netherlands, Italy, Russia, Spain, Sweden, UK, USA) a fairly regular cycle with a periodicity of 7-10 years. 16 The seven countries studied over the period 1960 by Drehmann, Borio and Tsatsaronis (2012 are:
Australia, Germany, Japan, Norway, Sweden, the United States and the United Kingdom. 17 STAMP estimates interventions variables, i.e. dummy variables defined to take the value zero up to the point in time in which an exogenous event occurs, and the value one thereafter. They are often associated with episodes such as changes in the government policy, external shocks, or wars.
terventions), the AR(2) cycle and the irregular component for the "LLT+AR(2)", which is our preferred model specification. A clear cyclical pattern is evident, somewhat irregular in amplitude. A similar graph for the "LLT(S)+Stoch. Cycle" model, not shown for space limitations, is available from the authors upon request. Further diagnostic checking for the "LLT+AR(2)" preferred model is provided in Figure 5 , which displays some residuals graphics:
18 from left to right and top to down, the residuals plot with error bands; their autocorrelation function; their estimated spectral density; a graph (histogram) of the residuals' empirical distribution (for illustrative purposes, a Normal probability density function and a kernel density estimate are also displayed). Except in a very few cases, the standardised residuals lie within the confidence bands. The sample autocorrelation function (ACF), with a maximum time lag equal to 20, is similar to that of a white noise, being always within the two standard error limits. The estimated power spectrum is flat and also similar to that of a white noise. Overall, this further diagnostic checking confirms that the "LLT+AR(2)" model seems to be legitimate for the trend-cycle extraction.
Based on the previous estimates, Figure 6 shows the estimated smoothed financial cyclical component employing the "LLT+AR(2)" model and the "LLT(S)+Stoch. Cycle" model. These estimates of the financial cycle are compared to the cycle resulting from the Baxter and King (1999, BK henceforth) filter -implemented with the optimal finite-sample approximation as in Christiano and Fitzgerald (2003) -and to the standard HP cycle. 19 The BK cycle is estimated selecting all the fluctuations in a range of periodicities comprised between 5 and 20 years. Overall, these alternative model specifications provide a rather consistent picture. In particular, prior to World War II, all the filtered cycles peaked at the end of the 1880s, in 1913, and somewhere in between 1930 and 1935. In the postwar, after a period of stability, three peaks were clearly visible in the first half of the 1970s, between 1990 and 1995, and in 2008-2010. In terms of the economic interpretation of our estimates, the peak in the early 1930s and the drastic decline that followed was related to the stock market crash of 1929 and to the Great Depression. The expansion/contraction phase in the first half of the 1970s seemed to be linked to the end of the Bretton Woods system and to the 1974-1975 global recession (that followed the 1973 first oil shock). The 2008 peak referred to the credit expansion phase which lasted until the eve of the global financial crisis. However, even if credit growth was sustained until 2008, it should be stressed that no major bank failures occurred in Italy after that crisis (nor after the explosion of the sovereign debt crisis in 2011).
The credit-to-GDP ratio gap and the occurrence of banking crises
As claimed by Drehmann, Borio and Tsatsaronis (2012) , a crucial issue for financial stability is the relationship between the phases of the financial cycle -i.e., credit expansion -and the occurrence of banking crises. In the same spirit, Jordà, Schularick and Taylor (2011a) argue that credit growth generates the best predictive signals of financial instability. If such a relationship does exist, then the statistical features of the financial cycle should be carefully monitored in order to prevent vulnerabilities and to identify potential risks for the financial system as a whole. 20 In what follows, focusing on our estimates of the Italian financial cycle, we examine whether there is any systematic evidence of a relationship between credit expansion and banking crises over the last 150 years. For a historical dating of the most important Italian banking crises in Italy we rely on Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) . These authors list twelve episodes of banking crises which have occurred in Italy since 1800: 1866, 1868, 1887, 1891, 1893, 1907, 1914, 1921-1922, 1930-1931, 1935, 1990-1995 and 2008 . These episodes are indicated by grey shaded areas in Figure 6 .
Other banking crisis databases are available in the literature. Notably, Laeven and Valencia (2008) propose a dataset which describes 42 systemic banking crises from 37 countries and also includes detailed information about the type of policy responses employed by governments to resolve them. Yet, the Laeven and Valencia dataset covers only the period 1970-2007, and hence does not fully fit to our purposes. Therefore, we accept the chronology of Reinhart and Rogoff even if we are aware of the fact that some crises -as we will see -are closely linked. This is the case of the 1866-1868, 1887-1893, and 1930-1935 episodes. 21 In the sequel we will summarise the main elements of the banking crises in Italy. We do not aim at providing a full account of the crises: in fact, our goal is mainly to examine the link 20 In this article the emphasis is on the credit-to-GDP ratio, but we acknowledge that other variables have been suggested as early warning indicators of future financial instability. Notable examples include total bank assets and measures of real estate and equity price appreciation, such as the percentage change in real estate prices and the stock market growth. For an analysis on the effectiveness of macroprudential instruments and on their implementation useful references are Borio and Drehmann (2009) , Rose and Spiegel (2009), Lim et al. (2011) and Panetta (2013) . 21 Toniolo (1995) , Carriero, Ciocca and Marcucci (2003), De Bonis (2008) and Gigliobianco and Giordano (2012) provide contributions on the most important crises that the Italian banking system has witnessed since 1861 and on connected regulatory changes.
between the occurrence of banking failures and deviation of credit-to-GDP from trend. After Italy reached political unification, the first crisis episode was in 1866-1868. The economic situation became difficult and prices declined on a global scale. Many banks failed in Western countries and the Italian banking system was also hit, with a suspension of convertibility declared by law in 1866 to avoid a wider collapse (Luzzatto, 1968 ). It appears that credit growth was not strong around those years.
Afterwards the Italian economy registered an expansionary phase, characterised by a house bubble and rapid credit growth. Convertibility was reintroduced in 1883. Another period of banking instability started in 1887, when the economy faced a serious recession. A massive outflow of capitals led to the weakening of the Italian lira and caused financial distress. Suspension of convertibility was again declared.
The peak of the financial cycle in 1887 is clearly visible in Figure 6 . This peak occurred slightly prior to the severe banking crisis that, in the early 1890s, hit Italy when prices in the real estate market fell, causing a deterioration of banks' balance sheets. This helps the interpretation of the 1891 and 1893 crises. In 1893, the Banca Romana corruption scandal led to the liquidation of this bank of issue and to the fall of Giolitti's government. The crisis was resolved in 1893 with the creation of the Bank of Italy, that became the leading bank of issue. Soon after, the Società generale di credito mobiliare italiano -an important intermediary which was very active in placing public debt securities and in long-term financing -accumulated large amounts of bad loans and went out of business (as underlined by Gigliobianco and Giordano, 2012 , one may refer to a single banking crisis over the period 1887-1893).
In 1907, the Società bancaria italiana -the third largest Italian bank at that time -was hit by the harsh international financial crisis that struck the United States and then spread to European countries. The company was bailed out by a banking consortium led by the Bank of Italy and other banks. After a few years, the Società bancaria italiana was absorbed by the Banca italiana di sconto. It should be noticed that Figure 6 shows that the 1907 crisis was preceded by a phase of credit expansion from 1900 to 1905.
The 1907 crisis was followed by the outbreak of World War I and the worsening of the international political situation. Even though Italy did not immediately enter into the conflict, its economic consequences were severe. The banking system was also involved. In order to avoid a bank run, a moratorium on bank deposits was in force from 1914 until 1915. In 1914 both deposits and loans declined, after twenty years of continuous growth (see Table 1 ). Furthermore, the Bank of Italy suspended the gold convertibility of the lira (Toniolo, 2003) . Notably, the Banco di Roma suffered considerable losses in 1914 and "was compelled to devalue the share capital" (Pohl and Freitag, 1994, p. 631) . Figure 6 aptly reflect these events, showing a cycle peak in 1910.
In 1921, one of the largest Italian banks at that time -Banca italiana di sconto -collapsed owing to its exposure to the company Ansaldo, which controlled its property. 22 The failure of the Banca italiana di sconto was followed, in 1922, by the new Banco di Roma crisis, which was resolved by government intervention. Like most industrial countries, Italy was hit by the Great Depression in 1929 and underwent a period of severe and prolonged decline in income. GDP turned down severely, as did industry, 23 firm's profits declined and bad loans increased rapidly. There were repeated bank failures from the end of the 1920s. 24 A peak in the cycle is clearly visible between 1932 and 1935, depending on the chosen structural decomposition (see Figure 6 ). It should be noticed that the persistent deflation in the 1930s contributed to the steady increase in the credit-to-GDP ratio.
In 1936 a comprehensive Banking Act was enacted, aiming to enlarge the supervisory powers of the Bank of Italy and to ensure banking stability also through limits to competition (see Toniolo, 1995) . The law featured severe regulation of entry, limitations in the geographical span of bank lending and separation of short from long-term lending.
From 1936 to the 1980s banking regulation remained almost unchanged, and mostly succeeded in supporting economic development through an efficient sectoral credit allocation. 25 A lending boom was clearly visible in the early 1970s; as anticipated in Section 3, in 1973 credit ceilings were introduced to steer monetary policy and as a result a phase of credit contraction began. Remarkably, as can be seen in Figure 6 , no major crisis episodes occurred until the end of the 1980s. 26 Between the end of the 1980s and the first 1990s credit strongly accelerated. Notably, and according to our estimates, a cycle peak occurred between 1992 and 1993. The main South- 22 Sraffa (1922) wrote that the failure of the Banca italiana di sconto was the result of the close relationship between mixed banks and firms; firms became increasingly dependent on banks, by taking control of them in order to secure funding. This led to the formation of large groups of industrial companies dependent on one or a few banks, mutual exchanges of common shares and the appointment of directors (the so called "interlocking directorate"). 23 For up-to-date comparisons with the other main European countries, see Felice and Carreras (2012) , pp.
448-449. 24 The three largest private banks -Banca Commerciale Italiana (COMIT), Credito Italiano (CREDIT) and Banco di Roma -experienced a deep crisis and the state intervened by establishing, in 1933, the "Istituto per la Ricostruzione Industriale" (IRI), a public holding company which aimed to provide a stimulus to the economy and to take control of the troubled banks. Consequently, COMIT, CREDIT and Banco di Roma were nationalised and became the largest state-owned banks. 25 Battilossi, Gigliobianco and Marinelli (2013) provide evidence of allocative efficiency only up to the early Seventies, and later on, in the Nineties, when financial liberalisation is thought of as having promoted once again the efficiency of the banking system. 26 A notable exception is the "Banco Ambrosiano scandal", erupted in 1982, which was essentially a fraudulentbankruptcy case. Also some special credit institutions were affected by capital adequacy and profitability problems that led to state recapitalisations, without resulting in major crises.
ern banks -all owned by the general government and already affected by allocative and cost inefficiencies -were hit by the 1992 crisis when Italy was forced to leave the European Monetary System. The consequences were very severe, especially because of the strong recession of 1992-1993. The crisis of the Southern banks was solved by favouring mergers, acquisitions and privatisations. In Italy the second half of the 1990s and the first years of the new Millennium did not register major banking crises. In contrast the situation changed drastically since 2007, when most of the OECD countries were hit by the global economic and financial crisis that erupted in 2008 with the failure of Lehman Brothers. Figure 6 shows that the 2007-2008 crisis was clearly preceded by a credit expansion. Yet, in Italy the global financial instability did not have disruptive consequences on the banking system. Also after the outbreak of the sovereign debt crisis in 2011 the government support to troubled banks was very limited.
In a nutshell, figure 6 shows that in 8 out of the 12 crises episodes selected by Reinhart and Rogoff there was indeed a preceding and/or a contemporaneous acceleration in the credit-to-GDP gap. This is the case of the crises of 1887, 1891, 1893, 1907, 1914, 1930-1931, 1935, and 1990-1995 . However, we must underline that in some cases -for instance in 1866, 1868 and 1921-1922 -banking crises took place without being preceded by an acceleration of credit. Most importantly, the strong growth of loans in the first 1970s was not followed by banking instability. On the other hand, the 2008 episode -selected by Reinhart and Rogoff for most Western countries after the failure of Lehman Brothers -was preceded by an acceleration of credit, even if in Italy liquidity and funding problems were the main explanation for bank troubles.
In order to further examine the link between financial cycle and banking crises, we complement the previous historical excursus with some econometric modelling: in particular, we estimate a binary choice model in which the dependent variable "crisis" is regressed on a constant and on contemporaneous and lagged values of the cyclical component extracted by fitting the "LLT+AR(2)" model. As already anticipated the extracted cyclical component provides us with an estimate of the credit-to-GDP gap. The binary dependent variable is equivalent to 1 in the event of crisis and 0 otherwise.
The Logit and Probit models are estimated in Eviews by maximum likelihood (by using the quadratic hill-climbing algorithm). The signs of the coefficients are identical across the two different specifications. Moreover, unsurprisingly, the estimate of the marginal effect obtained from the Logit model is roughly π/ √ 3 larger than that obtained from the Probit model (see, for instance, Verbeek, 2008) . Thus, only the Logit estimation output is presented in Table 7 (results based on the Probit specification are available from the authors upon request). The intercept and the explanatory variable are highly significant. The credit-to-GDP gap has a positive effect on the probability of banking crisis. Several estimations have been con-ducted by considering contemporaneous values of the credit-to-GDP gap and up to two lags of the same variable. The highest log likelihood and pseudo R-squared values are obtained with a specification which includes the intercept and the credit-to-GDP gap lagged once. The estimate of the financial cycle coefficient is positive and equal to 0.5; straightforward calculations show that an estimate of the corresponding marginal effect, evaluated at the sample mean of the explanatory variable, is roughly equal to 0.05: thus, over the time span 1861-2011, when the credit-to-GDP gap increases by one unit at time t-1, the probability of a banking crisis at time t increases of around 5 per cent. Therefore, as argued by Borio (2012) studying a set of advanced economies, the credit-to-GDP might be used as an indicator of incumbent crises also for Italy, in conjunction with a broader range of macroeconomic and financial variables. Figure 7 shows the actual and fitted values of the dependent variable from the estimated Logit specification.
Also visual inspection of Figure 7 confirms that an acceleration of credit preceded a banking crisis in 8 out of the 12 episodes listed by Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) . However, as already discussed, there were also a few cases -notably in the 1970s -in which the growth of the credit-to-GDP ratio was not followed by a banking crisis.
In summary, our key finding is that the Italian financial cycle has a lower frequency than traditional business cycles. Over the last 150 years, most episodes of banking crises seem to have been associated with (or preceded by) rapid credit expansion.
Conclusions
In this paper we have investigated the main stylised features of the Italian financial cycle. We have presented and analysed a new historical dataset which gathers the main items of banks' balance sheets since the unification of Italy in 1861. It is probably true that Italy is paid scant attention in the international quantitative literature (see Fratianni, Muscatelli, Spinelli and Trecroci, 2012) ; we hope that our new statistics will be of use in studying long-term trends in the Italian financial system. We reached three key findings.
1. While until the mid-1970s there was a close correlation between loans and deposits (both expressed as a ratio to GDP), over the last 20 years loans have increased in relation to deposits. Since the 1990s, banks have covered this "funding gap" mainly by issuing new debt securities.
2. The Italian financial cycle -extracted by means of a structural trend-cycle decomposition of the credit-to-GDP ratio -has a much longer duration than traditional business cycles.
Italy shares this feature with the US and other European countries.
3. Episodes of financial distress mainly reflect previous long-term credit developments. In fact, an acceleration of credit preceded a banking crisis in 8 out of the 12 episodes listed by Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) . Consistently, a simple Logit regression shows a positive association between the probability of a banking crisis and a previous acceleration of the credit-to-GDP gap. Thus, we argue that the credit-to-GDP gap may help in evaluating the likelihood of future financial crises. However, there were also periods -such as the early 1970s -in which the growth of the credit-to-GDP ratio was not followed by a banking crisis. Moreover, some crises cannot be attributed to an extraordinary preceding increase in loans.
It is worth noting that in this paper we have identified the financial cycle by focusing only on the credit-to-GDP ratio. A desirable extension of this work would be examining a broader range of variables: for instance, residential property prices, equity prices, or macro-financial indicators such as the loan-to-value ratio. Yet, given our interest on long-term cycles, some care should be taken because some of these time series might be too short (due to data availability constraints) to permit meaningful trend-cycle extraction.
The time series presented here lay the foundation for further steps in many other directions. It will be interesting to study the degree of stability of the relationship between deposits and loans and the long-term relationship between money, credit and GDP. Another important policy issue which deserves to be investigated is the link between house price bubbles and banking crises. All this is to be explored in future research. The estimated model is the local linear trend in (2) with σ 2 η = 0 ("smooth trend") and stationary stochastic cycle as in (3) and (4). The symbol (***) means statistically significant at the 1 % level. The symbol (***) means statistically significant at the 1 % level. The dependent variable is the binary dependent variable "Crisis" which takes value 1 in the event of crisis and 0 elsewhere. The banking crises dates are those reported by Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) . The explanatory variable is the cyclical component extracted by fitting the "LLT+AR(2)" model (lagged once). A constant is included. The top part of the table displays the coefficient estimates, the asymptotic standard errors, the z-statistics and corresponding p-values. The symbol (***) means statistically significant at the 1 % level. The bottom part of the table provides some descriptive statistics such as the mean and standard deviation of the dependent variable, the standard error of the regression, and the sum of the squared residuals. In addition, several likelihood based statistics are presented, such as: the Akaike, Schwarz and Hannan-Quinn information criteria, the maximized value of the log likelihood function (Log likelihood), the LR statistic (which tests the joint null hypothesis that all slope coefficients except the constant are zero), the p-value of the LR test statistic (asymptotically distributed as a chi-squared variable, with degrees of freedom equal to the number of restrictions under test). The number of observations is also reported. Loans-to-deposits ratio Loans-to-deposits and debt securities issued ratio 1860 1870 1880 1890 1900 1910 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 Loans-to-deposits ratio Loans-to-deposits and debt securities issued ratio The estimated model is a "LLT" (with interventions) fitted to "credit-to-GDP", which is defined as credit expressed as a ratio to GDP. From top to down: time series plot of standardised residuals; their spectral density. The estimated model is a "LLT+AR(2)" (with interventions) fitted to "credit-to-GDP", which is defined as credit expressed as a ratio to GDP. The estimated model is "LLT+AR(2)" (with interventions) fitted to "credit-to-GDP", which is defined as credit expressed as a ratio to GDP. From left to right and top to down: time series plot with error bands; autocorrelation function; spectral density; histogram with kernel density estimate and normal density function. 1900 1910 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 1900 1910 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 "Crisis" is a binary dependent variable which takes value 1 in the event of crisis and 0 elsewhere. The banking crises dates are those reported by Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) . The fitted values are those of the Logit model.
